



European Union

**Statement on the occasion of the IAEA Board of Governors
Vienna, 9 – 14 September 2013
Agenda item 6 (d): Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement
and relevant provisions of the United Nations Security Council
resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran**

Mr. Chairman,

1. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. [The following countries align themselves with this declaration: Turkey[§], the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia^{*}, Montenegro^{*}, Iceland[‡], Serbia^{*}, Albania^{*}, Bosnia and Herzegovina^{*}, Liechtenstein⁺, Norway⁺, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.]
2. The European Union would like to thank the Director General for his report contained in document GOV/2013/40 on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Deputy Director General, Herman Nackaerts and his staff, for the informative technical briefing on 4 September.

Mr. Chairman,

3. This report illustrates once again that Iran persists in violating IAEA Board of Governors and United Nations Security Council Resolutions by inter alia continuing to expand significantly its enrichment capacity, continuing to accumulate enriched uranium and continuing its heavy water activities. This ongoing expansion of sensitive nuclear activities and Iran's continued lack of cooperation with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues including possible military dimensions, further aggravates our deep concerns on the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

[§] Candidate Country

^{*} Candidate Countries former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia as well as potential Candidate Countries Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

[‡] Candidate Country Iceland continues to be a member of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.

⁺ Norway and Liechtenstein are members of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.

Specifically, Iran has, over the reporting period:

- expanded its enrichment capacity at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant by installing considerable numbers of centrifuges. Compared to the DG's report of last May, 1,861 additional IR-1 centrifuges have been installed, bringing the installed capacity to more than 15,000 IR -1 centrifuges, of which two thirds are currently in operation. Moreover, since May, Iran has also installed an additional 319 centrifuges of the more advanced IR-2m type, bringing the total of these more advanced machines to around 1,000. These centrifuges could be operational soon. Iran has also completed the preparatory work for the installation of a further 2,000 of these more advanced machines. In the event that all the installed centrifuges enter into operation, Iran will be able to enrich uranium considerably more quickly. Whilst, compared to August 2012, the number of cascades in operation has remained constant, we note that the total installed capacity of centrifuges in Natanz and Fordow is now above 19,000 machines, a figure that is almost double that of a year ago, and that Iran has installed a further 2,180 centrifuges since the last report.
- continued its enrichment activities at Natanz and at Fordow, resulting in a total quantity of more than 370kg of UF6 enriched up to 20%. We note that conversion continues. However, Iran is still converting less than enriching. Iran's stockpile of 20% UF6 has increased to 185.8kg. Enrichment of UF6 up to 3.5% also continues, and Iran has now produced a total of 9,704 kg, of which 6,774 kg remain in stock.
- continued to make steady progress in its heavy water related activities. The report states that, although Iran has not provided access to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) at Arak since August 2011, based on recent images available to the Agency, the plant appears to continue to be in operation. Iran has also continued construction of the IR-40 Reactor at Arak, in the absence of the required design information: the reactor vessel has now been placed into position, and fuel assemblies have started to be produced. We share the concerns of the Director General regarding the need for this information to be provided as early as possible in order, inter alia, to ensure that all possible diversion paths are identified.

Mr. Chairman, all these activities are in blatant breach of six UNSC Resolutions, the provisions of which are mandatory, and twelve binding Resolutions of the IAEA Board.

4. Despite ten rounds of talks with Iran since the Director General's November 2011 report and its Annex, it has not been possible for the Agency to reach agreement on the 'structured approach' or to begin substantive work on the outstanding issues, including those pointing to

possible military dimensions, despite their unwavering efforts. At the last Board meeting in June, the EU and other Board members requested an explanation for the difficulties relating to agreeing the 'structured approach'. We therefore welcome the clear response from the DG in his report in setting out the seven principles which, as the Agency states, are essential to enable it to conduct the effective verification activities that it considers necessary to support credible conclusions'.

Mr. Chairman,

5. Any further procrastination is unacceptable. As the DG has said, the "structured approach document is not an end in itself, nor is the negotiation process". International concerns will only be allayed by concrete actions, not by words. Two years is more than enough time to address the Agency's concern over the possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme. Iran must urgently cooperate and provide the Agency with access to all the people, documents and sites requested and provide substantial answers to the detailed questions regarding Parchin and the foreign expert. The onus is firmly on Iran to comply with all its international obligations. Therefore, we urge Iran to engage constructively with the IAEA and to achieve substantial progress on the substance of the main concerns at the next round of talks scheduled for 27 September in Vienna.

6. Mr Chairman, the EU once again strongly urges Iran to implement the Resolutions of the UN Security Council and the Resolutions of the Board of Governors that clearly require Iran to suspend its enrichment activities and heavy water related projects, including research and development, and implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement. Iran must bring into force its Additional Protocol which is a requirement under UNSC and Board of Governors resolutions. The EU deeply regrets that due to the continued failure by Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues, in particular those related to the possible military dimensions, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore is not able to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities. November will mark two years since the Director General's PMD Annex and Resolution GOV/2011/69, and will be an important juncture to assess progress on substance on this issue and what further action could be needed from the Board should no progress have been made by that point. In this context, we take note of the remarks by the Iranian elected President related to greater transparency and hope to see them translated into concrete actions.

7. Finally, the EU's objective remains to achieve a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term settlement, which would build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear

programme, while respecting Iran's legitimate rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in conformity with the NPT, and in full compliance with UN Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions. The EU fully supports the ongoing diplomatic efforts led by the High Representative, together with China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the UK and the US to seek a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. They are fully prepared to resume talks once the new Iranian nuclear negotiating team is appointed. We urge the new Iranian leadership to engage constructively in meaningful negotiations as soon as practicable.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.