



## European Union

**Statement on the occasion of the IAEA Board of Governors  
Vienna, 29 – 30 November 2012  
Agenda item 4 (b): Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement  
and relevant provisions of the United Nations Security Council  
resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran**

Mr. Chairman,

1. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Acceding Country Croatia\*, the Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*, Montenegro\*, Iceland\*\* and Serbia\*, the Countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this statement.
2. The European Union would like to thank the Director General for his report contained in document GOV/2012/55 on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The EU would also like to thank Deputy Director General Herman Nackaerts for the informative technical briefing on the report, given on 21 November.

Mr Chairman,

3. It is with very serious concern that the EU notes that, one year after the Director General's report GOV/2011/65, setting out in its Annex a detailed and compelling analysis of information indicating that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device, Iran has made no attempt to engage with the Agency on substance. Despite two subsequent Board resolutions in November 2011 and September 2012 expressing "serious concern" about the unresolved issues and stating that it was "essential and urgent" for Iran to cooperate with the Agency on all outstanding substantive issues, Iran has still failed to take any serious practical steps to address these "deep and increasing concerns".

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\* Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia continue to be part of the Stabilization and Association Process.

\*\* Iceland remains an EFTA country and member of the European Economic Area

4. Since the November 2011 report, the Agency has held six rounds of talks with Iran. Regrettably, the Director General, in his report, clearly states that no progress has been made on agreeing a structured approach, that Iran still refuses to grant the Agency access to sites, and that he is "unable to report any progress on clarifying the issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme".
5. Mr Chairman, the EU considers, once again, the procrastination by Iran to be unacceptable. We strongly urge Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency and, pursuant to Resolution GOV/2012/50, "to immediately conclude and implement a structured approach", based on the 13 points defined in the DG's Report GOV/2011/65. Iran must act now, in a substantive way, to address the serious and continuing international concerns on its nuclear programme.
6. The EU has, once again, to stress the importance of granting early access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran, as and when requested by the Agency. We therefore fully support the repeated requests by the Agency to visit the Parchin site, but which have still been denied by Iran. The EU shares the Agency's ongoing concerns about the extensive activities and resulting changes that have taken place at Parchin, including, inter alia, the removal of buildings, initial scraping and removal of considerable quantities of earth and the 'shrouding' of a building containing a vessel, which the Agency has information to indicate was constructed to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. As the report states, "such experiments would be strong indicators of possible nuclear weapon development". In the light of these extensive activities, the Agency reports that, should it gain access to the site, "its ability to conduct effective verification will have been seriously undermined". We are strongly concerned by this conclusion and therefore fully endorse the assessment of the Agency that it needs to be provided with substantive answers to its detailed questions and to have full access to the location at Parchin without further delay. We are confident that the DG in his next report will state whether Iran has taken any substantive steps to address the Agency's concerns over the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.

Mr Chairman,

7. The EU condemns the continuing production of enriched uranium and expansion of Iran's enrichment capacity, including at the Fordow site, and continued heavy water activities, in breach of UN Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors' Resolutions, as reflected in the most recent IAEA Report. These enrichment activities are unacceptable. So far Iran has produced 232.8 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235, and has tripled its production capacity since January 2012. As stated before, this ongoing 20% enrichment production, as well as the increasing inventory, considerably exceeds Iran's proclaimed needs and further aggravates concerns about the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme. The EU notes with concern that this inventory has reached an amount of 134.9 kg of 20% enriched UF<sub>6</sub> presently stored and that

another 96.3 kg has been converted into U3O8. We further note with concern that Iran has now produced a total of 7611 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 since it began production of such material. We note also with particular concern that at the FFEF, Iran has now completed the installation of centrifuges. If Iran decided to start the full operation of the installed cascades, this could result in a fourfold capacity increase of 20% enrichment at Fordow. This development makes it more urgent for Iran to respond to the IAEA request for clarification about this facility and about the cascades that are to be used for the enrichment up to 5% U-235, and/or enrichment up to 20% U-235. We note that Iran has not yet used this additional capacity. We look forward to timely information on any new significant developments in this regard.

8. The EU is also deeply worried that, in breach of the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended all work on heavy water related projects, including the construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor at Arak (IR-40), which is under Agency safeguards.

We note that, contrary to Iran's obligations under the modified Code 3.1, Iran has still not provided the Agency with an updated DIQ for the IR-40 Reactor. We also note with concern that this lack of up-to-date information is having an adverse impact on the Agency's ability to effectively verify the design of the facility and to implement an effective safeguards approach.

Mr Chairman, all of these issues further add to the serious concerns of the International Community about the real purpose of Iran's nuclear programme.

9. Mr. Chairman,  
The EU's objective remains to achieve a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term settlement, which would build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, while respecting Iran's legitimate rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in conformity with the NPT, and fully taking into account UN Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions. The EU fully supports the diplomatic efforts led by the High Representative, together with China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, UK and the US to seek a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

10. Mr Chairman,  
The EU must conclude by once again strongly urging Iran to implement the six mandatory Resolutions of the UN Security Council and the twelve binding Resolutions of the Board of Governors. We reiterate our message to Iran that it must suspend its enrichment activities and heavy water related projects, including research and development, and implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement. Bringing into force its Additional Protocol is also a requirement under UNSC resolutions. The EU deeply regrets that due to the continued failure by Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency, the latter is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared

nuclear material and activities in Iran and therefore is not able to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.

11. Finally, Mr Chairman, the European Union will continue to work with all Board members to ensure a firm Board response should Iran continue to ignore its obligations to the Agency

Thank you Mr. Chairman.